This study examines the relationship between Bumiputra (in reference to Malay indigenous race) directors, a proxy for culture and analysts forecast. In addition, the study investigates whether corporate governance affects that relationship. Based on a sample from 1999 to 2009 and 664 observations, we find a positive and significant relationship between culture and analysts forecast error suggesting that Bumiputra directors lead to less transparent information environment. However, we find limited evidence to support that good governance weakens the positive relationship between Bumiputra directors and analysts forecast error.
Introduction
Financial analysts are important players in the capital market. Their role in analysing information, either publicly and privately obtained is crucial in determining the progress of firms, especially in terms of quality of earnings. There are abundance of research on role of financial analysts in the capital market with such focus on analysts' forecasts, analysts' coverage and the effect on future income (see Bradshaw, 2011; Ramnath et al., 2008 for review of literature on analysts' research). In addition, many studies examined the determinants of analysts' forecasts. However, evidence has been limited in relation to examining the impact of cultural values of earning forecasts. Our sample country, Malaysia represents this opportunity in examining whether such association exist between cultural values and analysts forecasts.
Cultural values according to Storz (1999) Malaysian government policy itself was seen as positive discrimination (Gomez & 1 The term Bumiputra or 'sons of the soil' was popularized during the 1920s and 1930s by the British colony to distinguish the indigenous people of Malaya (now Malaysia), the majority of whom are Malays, from the Chinese or Indian immigrants, the non-indigenous people. Article 160 (2) of the Malaysian Constitution 1957 defines Malays as a person, who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language and conforms to Malay custom. Jomo, 1999) , but on one hand, the assistance is much needed to reduce wealth imbalance among ethnics. Pryor (2007) argues that when economic institutions are not imposed by force, the cultural characteristics are more likely to determine the economic system, rather than economic institutions. This statement is partially true when we examine the studies of Mitton (2002) and Bushman et al. (2004) which suggest that Malaysia is weak in legal enforcement. We could argue that due to the relatively weak legal enforcement of rules and regulations of the capital market, cultural characteristics will take precedence in business dealings, and shapes the capital market. Gray (1988) developed accounting values based on Hofstede (1980) cultural values. 2 Gray (1988) argues that cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980) influence a country's accounting system in two ways; (1) through their influence on a country's institutions 2 We admit that there has been some concern raised by the academic world regarding Hofstede understanding on culture. Please see Baskerville (2003) and Baskerville-Morley (2005) for some arguments against Hofstede cultural studies. Although we admit limitations exists, at the same time we believe that the cultural dimensions offered by Hofstede is the best current cultural dimension model that could be used in capital market research.
such as its capital market and ; (2) through their influence on accounting values, such as conservatism, that are shared by members of the accounting subculture within a country (Doupnik, 2008) . 3 The outcome of the Hofstede-Gray framework suggests that Bumiputra directors are less compliant to regulations, secretive and will have lower level of disclosure as relative to Chinese directors. The seminal work of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examine the relationship between cultural values and corporate governance disclosure in Malaysia. Contrary to their prediction based on the Hofstede-Gray framework, they find that Chinese directors are secretive and risk averse relative to the Bumiputra which reflected on the corporate governance disclosure. Other studies examine the relationship between culture with earnings quality (Abdul Rahman & Mohammad Ali, 2006; Mohamed Yunos et al., 2012) , audit related studies (Che Ahmad et al., 2006; Syed Mustapha Nazri et al., 2012) , and corporate governance (Salleh et al., 2006; Yatim et al., 2006; Abdul Wahab et al., 2007) . These studies rely on the Hofstede-Gray framework which argues that Bumiputras have lower level of disclosure and low level of legal compliance. The results of these studies are rather consistent throughout, and give support to the framework which link Hofstede cultural values with accounting values.
The second strand of cultural research is closely tailored to the early development of the capital market in Malaysia. Since the development of the capital market is loosely based on racial ground, studies have also treated different groups that have access to preferential treatment from the government. Gul (2006) examines the relationship between political connections and audit fees in Malaysia in which he 3 Please see Doupnik and Tsakumis (2004) for a critical review of Gray (1988) accounting values.
adopts Bumiputra directors as a proxy for connected firms. Johl et al. (2012) investigate the characteristics of the CEO ethnicity and audit fees. Abdul Wahab et al. (2014) adopt similar approach when examining the issue of non-audit fees and auditor independence. The premise of these papers is that the preferential treatment connected firms get, proxied by Bumiputra directors will lead to the firm being riskier and inefficient. This is further supported by financial reporting quality studies such as Bushman et al. (2004) and the possible bailout by government for connected firms (Faccio et al., 2006) . Group lead by top local institutional investors, primarily to protect minority interests, and compulsory training for directors in relation to corporate governance. These initiatives manage to enhance transparency (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007) , and increase level of earnings quality and disclosure (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006 However, our extended analysis could not lend any support that corporate governance mitigates the positive relationship posited between culture and forecast error.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Institutional background discussing on Malaysia's socio and political economy and the recent development on corporate governance is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents arguments for our empirical predictions while Section 4 discussed the research method and data description.
Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.
2.

Institutional Background
Malaysia socio and political economy
Malaysian corporate ownership is divided into groups of ethnicity such as Malays, Chinese, Indian and other small minority groups. The group of ethnicity are divided into ethnic lines which can be clearly observed in the listed firm whose share ownership and board membership are dominated by two main ethnic groups namely Bumiputra Malays and the Chinese (Yatim et al., 2006) .
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In Malaysia, although Indian is one of the main ethnic groups, the power in socio-economic activities and political policy making are denominated by Bumiputra
Malays and Chinese (Yatim, et al., 2006) . Every ethnicity has their own believes and ideology which influences the way of thinking, decision making and direction of an organisation. The term Bumiputra was coined by the British to differentiate between the indigenous (Malays) and the non-indigenous people of the then Malaya, now Malaysia. Mohammad Yusuf (2012) states three important premises on why there is a need to differentiate between Bumiputras and non-Bumiputras, although Malaysia is no longer a British colony. The first premise is the basis for division lies in the belief that Bumiputras having an indigenous status do not have a share in the economy that reflect their proportion in the population while the second premise is that the government policies should be oriented to redress this economic imbalance. The third premise is, it is believed that a more equitable participation of Bumiputras will help to promote political stability. Historical factors and cultural characteristics appear to have significant impact on the development of the capital market. Mansor and Kennedy (2000) state that Malay cultural values have developed from a history of communal living and cooperation and are often viewed as being high on collectivism.
One could argue that this historical premise lead to weak entrepreneurial skills as relative to other ethnic groups in Malaysia.
In 
Corporate Governance initiatives in Malaysia
The topic of corporate governance is not new in Malaysia. However in the past, or specifically before the Asian Financial Crisis, the main corporate governance mechanisms relied on the rules and regulations imposed by the regulators in Malaysia.
This is in part probably due to the lack of market for corporate control (takeovers, mergers) in Malaysia (Faccio et al., 2006) . As such, these regulations are 
Empirical Predictions
Cultural Values and Analysts Forecast Error
We offer two arguments on the relationship between cultural values, based on the two strand of research discussed earlier. The first argument is socio-economy argument while the second one is political-economy argument. The socio-economy argument resides on the Hofstede-Gray framework that links cultural values with accounting values. Culture is define as learned, socially acquired traditions and life style of the members of a society, including their patterned, repetitious way of thinking, feeling and acting (Harris, 1987) . Chuah (1995) finds Malaysian managers are influenced by race, education and type of organisation that they work for.
Hofstede and Gray theoretical framework is often used to relate cultural value and accounting system (Perera, 1989; Fechner et al., 1994; Willet et al., 1995; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) . Hofstede-Gray theoretical framework explained the characteristic of Bumiputra (Malay) and Chinese culture values and accounting disclosure information. [ Table 1 about here]
The framework shows that Bumiputra directors experience high level of power distance and uncertainty avoidance while low level of masculinity and individualism.
These cultural traits of Bumiputra directors resulted in low level of professionalism 6 Hofstede (1980) cultural dimensions: i. Power distance: the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. ii.
Masculinity: refers to a society in which gender roles are distinct with me expected to be tough and assertive. iii.
Uncertainty avoidance: the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations. iv.
Individualism: refers to a society wherein ties between members are relatively loose.
7 Gray (1988) accounting values: i. Professionalism versus statutory control: A preference for the exercise of individual professional judgment and the maintenance of professional self-regulation as opposed to compliance with legal requirements and statutory control. ii.
Uniformity versus flexibility: A preference for the enforcement of uniform accounting practices between companies and for the consistent use for such practices over time as opposed to flexibility in accordance with the perceived circumstances of individual companies. iii.
Conservatism versus optimism: A preference for a cautious approach to measurement so as to cope with the uncertainty of future events as opposed to more optimistic. iv.
Secrecy versus transparency: A preference for confidentiality and the restriction of disclosure of information about the business only to those who are closely involved with its management and financing as opposed to a more transparent, open and publicly accountable approach.
and high level of secrecy, uniformity and conservatism. Based on the outcome of the Hofstede-Gray framework, these will result in low compliance with legal requirements, low disclosure and less flexibility and optimism. Overall, we could conclude that the cultural traits coupled with accounting values, will result in the firms with higher level of Bumiputra directors to experience higher risk, as supported by Gul (2006) , low level of disclosure in relations to financial reporting and less compliance (Johnson & Mitton, 2003) to capital markets regulations. Low disclosure reduces the quality of accounting information which leads to low accuracy analyst forecast. Study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) however find contradicting result to
Hofstede-Gray theoretical framework. They find Bumiputra directors have more information disclosure which contradict with the Hofstede-Gray theory. Increase of accounting information quality enhances analysts forecast. Theoretical arguments raised by studies (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002 on socio-economy argument suggest that firms dominated by Bumiputras directors are rather weak in disclosure less compliance to rules and regulations.
The political-economy argument is based on the notion of capital market development in Malaysia that initiated by the support to the Bumiputras. Malaysia capital market is largely developed based on relationship-based economy (Gul, 2006) .
The political economy argument raised by the likes of Gomez and Jomo (1999) , Johnson and Mitton (2002) , and Gul (2006) state that these firms are dependent on government funding and has less reliance on foreign funding, are inefficient, riskier due to uncertainty in their cash inflow and are less transparent. The outcomes of these two strands of arguments are rather similar. The corporate governance mechanism in this paper comprises of duality, board independence, board size and ownership structures. Prior studies find the presence of CEO duality in an organisation reflects poor governance (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996) . Byrad et al. (2006) finds the presence of CEO duality in organisation has negative relationship with the accuracy of analysts' forecast. Core et al. (1999) specify that fewer independent of Board of director cause for poor monitoring. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that adding more independent board will increase the company monitoring diligence. Thus, board independence has positive relationship with the accuracy of analysts' forecast (Byrad et al., 2006) .
Board director size refers to the total number of directors in the organisation. 
Measure for Analysts Forecast Error
The dependent variable in the above equation is accuracy of analysts' forecast. Chang et al. (2007) use forecast error to measure firm performance; Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) use analysts forecast to examine quality of accounting information. Byard et al. (2010) use forecast error to measure transparency of financial reporting.
Unlike other studies mentioned above, this study used forecast error to measure effect of corporate governance and culture to accuracy of analysts' forecast. Accuracy of analysts forecast is measured by forecast error (FE). In formula form, forecast error (FE) is written as:
FORECAST ERROR (FE) = LN (ABS (
�Actual Forecast-Median Forecast�
Where ACTUAL FORECAST is the actual annual earnings as reported by I/B/E/S; MEDIAN FORECAST is the median of analysts' forecast for a year period;
and PRICE is the stock price last day prior the announcement date of earning per share.
Culture (BUMI)
Similar to 
Corporate Governance 9
This study will look into four (4) dimensions of corporate governance factors; duality (DUALITY), board independence (BODIND), and board size (BODSIZE) as 9 When studying the association between corporate governance and analysts forecast, we treat governance structures as exogenous. Our approach is the same as that of Core et al. (1999) where they observe that ''Following most prior empirical research in this area, we treat the board and ownership structures as exogenous, when economic theory would argue that these variables are endogenous.'' This well-established approach of treating governance structures as exogenous is reasonable, in the sense that some institutional features of contracting cause governance characteristics to be ''sticky.'' For example, directors serve for fixed terms, so naturally it takes time to change board members to adjust to a changed operating environment. Consistent with many prior studies, we argue that it is difficult for firms to have optimal governance structures at all times (e.g., see Larcker et al., 2007) .
internal governance while external governance is tested by institutional ownership (INSTOWN).
Duality (DUALITY)
Duality (DUALITY) refers to separation of chief executive officer (CEO) from the chairman of the board. This variable is measured as a dummy variable equal to one when CEO and chairman is separated or zero otherwise. MCCG (2001) recommends a separation between the position of CEO and chairman to ensure a balance of power and authority. Proponents of combining these positions suggest that such method helps the person-in-charge and will have minimal interference in relation to decision making. In addition, combining such position will enhance and hasten decision making process and ensure that objectives of the firms are being met in a timely manner (Dahya et al., 1996) . Opponents of having these two positions given to an individual suggest that the CEO needs monitoring and such practice could lead to opportunistic behaviour (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) argue that the combination of these two positions to a sole individual is an indicator of poor governance. We predict a negative relationship between DUALITY and FE suggesting that firms that separate the CEO and Chairman functions will have better monitoring function and thus provide better governance mechanism for the firm. Therefore, it create better information environment and creates transparency. 
Board Independence (BODIND)
Our second corporate governance variable is board independence which is the proportion of independent directors on the board of directors. The premise of this variable resides on the notion of agency issues between the managers or directors and shareholders whom are the owners of the firms. The presence of independent directors mitigate any agency problem by exercising proper monitoring on executive directors. Core et al. (1999) indicate that less independent outside directors provide poor monitoring and thus we expect a negative relationship between the percentage of independent directors and analysts forecast error. Klein (2002) 
Board Size (LNBODSIZE)
Our third internal corporate governance mechanism is the size of board of directors. The effect of board size is rather ambiguous. Small boards are viewed to be more effective as they could make sound decision in a shorter period of time as relative to a bigger board (Jensen, 1993) . As such, as the number of board of directors grows, policies are being argued thoroughly and could make the decisions being conveyed at a slower pace and make them less effective (Yermack, 1996) .
Furthermore, as the number of directors grows, the role of board of directors is rather symbolic rather than serving a monitoring purpose (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2000) .
Hence, one could view that the monitoring by board of directors weaken as their number grows.
Alternatively, the number of directors could demonstrate economies of scale.
It could provide resources to the firms through the connections obtain from directors. Haniffa and Hudaib (2005) argue that a small board may be seen to be more effective to improve performance and to limit directors' incentives to shirk, as the role performance of each member is easier to monitor and decisions can be made more quickly. On the other hand, bigger boards could provide the diversity needed to secure critical resources and contacts. Byard et al. (2006) find a negative relationship between the total number of directors on board and forecast accuracy suggesting that the larger the board, the less effective it will be in relationship of monitoring and good governance. Based on these competing arguments, we predict a relationship between the number of directors on the board and forecast accuracy. Our operational definition for board size is the natural log transformation of the number of directors on board (LNBODSIZE).
Institutional Ownership (INSTOWN)
Our external corporate governance mechanism is the percentage of top five (5) institutional ownership. Institutional investors are expected to play a fiduciary role and acts in the best interest of their contributors (Hawley & Williams, 1997) . In addition, Jennings (2005) 
Other Determinants of Analysts Forecast
Direct managerial ownership MANOWN is the proportion of shares held by CEO and executive directors. Baik et al. (2007) find analysts' forecasts declines as managerial ownership increases. Analysts following (LNNUMEST) are the natural log transformation of the numbers of analysts following a firm. Eng and Mark (2003) find analyst following is negatively correlated to forecast error. Thus, we predict negative relationship between analysts following and analysts forecast error. Forecast horizon (LNHORIZON) is the natural log transformation of the day's basis which calculates the difference between the actual date and forecast date. Previous study finds shorten forecast horizon tend to result in less error and are less extreme (Capstaff et al., 1995) .
This means the longer the forecast horizon, the more exposure to error and more extreme. Thus, we predict positive relationship between forecast horizon and analysts forecast error. Firm size refers to firm's market capitalisation (MKTCAP). Company assets show the capability and strength of the market to compete in the market. Jelic et al. (1998) Behn et al. (2008) suggest that financial reporting reliability increases with audit quality, which they infer from auditor size and industry specialisation. Behn et al. (2008) state that brand name auditors are viewed as providing higher quality audits based on their perceived competence and independence. Therefore, it is likely that a financial analysts forecast ability increases with the quality or reliability of financial information they use to predict future earnings (Behn et al., 2008) . Therefore, we predict negative relationship between BIGN and analysts forecast error.
XLIST takes the value of 1 if the firm is cross listed overseas. Risk refers to firms' standard deviation on return on asset (STROA). This variable determines the firm level of uncertainty in market condition. The risk is measured on the return on asset over three years. Huang et al. (2006) find firm with low risk has better corporate governance and better accuracy of analysts forecast. We predict positive relationship between standard deviation of return on asset and analyst forecast.
We have included industries dummies (INDUSTRIES) to control for the variation on analysts forecast among industries in Malaysia. [ Table 2 about here] [ Table 3 about here] Table 4 [ Table 4 about here] Table 5 tabulates the correlations analysis for the variables used in this study. [ Table 5 about here]
Sample Description
Results
Univariate Analysis
We extend the univariate analysis by examining the differences in mean and median between firms that are below and above the median value for the number of Bumiputra directors, presented in Table 6 . We find significant differences for both mean and median between these two samples for FE as the firms with more than three (3) Bumiputra directors record significantly higher forecast error. We observed significant differences between these two samples for the corporate governance variables, with the exception of BODIND. Both of our univariate analysis provide support that a positive relationship exist between the proportion of Bumiputra directors and forecast error.
[ Table 6 about here] Table 7 tabulates the regression analysis. 11 Column 1 of Table 7 presents the results without the interaction terms between BUMI and the corporate governance variables. Column 1 of Table 7 documents a positive and significant relationship between BUMI and FE (0.008, t=2.979, p<0.01) . This supports our hypothesis that Bumiputra directors are more secretive and low on disclosure, which is based on the Hofstede-Gray framework. This finding also support our second argument that firms with Bumiputra directors showed characteristics of political connections in which these firms are inefficient (Johnson & Mitton, 2003) and weak on corporate governance. The positive relationship also suggests that these firms have less amount of information for financial analysts to assess and make sound judgment from. We find a significantly positive relationship between LNBODSIZE and FE (0.895, t=2.840, p<0.01) , inferring that the larger the board of directors, the larger the forecast error. Our results support the argument raised by Yermack (1996) that bigger 11 For the sake of brevity, the regressions are presented without the coefficients for industries and period dummies. The industries variables (based on Table 3 ), yield insignificant results. Therefore, we could conclude that the variation of analysts forecast error are not affected by industry classifications. In addition, the period F test for the period is 2.169, p<0.05. Therefore, the period effects during the sample period are significant. Regression results with industries and period dummies can be obtain from the corresponding author.
Multivariate Analysis
boards are less effective in terms of monitoring. We could not find any support for the remaining corporate governance variables effects on the forecast error. Our main control variables which are analysts following (LNNUMEST), forecast horizon (LNHORIZON) and firm size (MKTCAP) are significant and remain robust throughout the regressions models.
We extended the initial regression model by introducing interaction terms from column 2 to column 6, in which column 6 presents the final regression that includes all the interaction terms between corporate governance variables and BUMI.
The only interaction term that is significant is BUMI and BODIND which is positively associated with FE. Based on column 3 and 6, the coefficient of BUMI*BODIND suggest that the presence of Bumiputra directors weakens the negative, but insignificant relationship between BODIND and FE.
[ Table 7 about here]
Conclusion
We investigate the relationship between cultural values, proxy by the proportion of Bumiputra directors on board and analysts forecast error. Further, we investigate the relationship between corporate governance and forecast error. We find a positive relationship between the proportion of Bumiputra directors and forecast error. Our findings support the Hofstede-Gray framework which suggests that
Bumiputras are individualistic and secretive that leads to less disclosure quality. As for our corporate governance mechanisms, we find a positive relationship between size of the board of directors and forecast error. We then extended our analysis by examining the interaction term between culture and corporate governance against forecast error. We find that the presence of corporate governance mechanisms do not improve or weakens the positive relationship between culture and forecast error.
Our study is not without any caveats. Our study depends on data availability from the I/B/E/S database and that could represent some degree of biasness towards our findings. Furthermore, due to lack of data availability, we did not control for other variables that are proven to be significant in Malaysia's capital market such as the role of audit committee. However, we view our study as catalysts for further research on financial analysts in the future. Institutions 0.5 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3.0 2.2 n/a Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Second Malaysia Plan, 1971 -1975 (Malaysia, 1971 , p. 40) Third Malaysian Plan, 1976 -1980 (Malaysia, 1976 , p. 184) Fourth Malaysian Plan, 1981 -1985 (Malaysia, 1981 , p. 61) Sixth Malaysian Plan, 1990 -1995 (Malaysia, 1990 , p. 13) Seventh Malaysian Plan, 1996 -2000 (p.86) Ninth Malaysian Plan, 2006 -2010 (Malaysia, 2006 , p. 356-57) Tenth Malaysian Plan, 2011 -2015 (Malaysia, 2011 FE is natural log transformation of absolute forecast error scaled by share price. BODBUMI is the number of Bumiputra directors on board. BUMI is percentage of Bumiputra directors on board. DUALITY takes the value of 1 if the firm separates the CEO and Chairman functions. BODIND is the percentage of independent directors on board. BODSIZE is the total number of directors on board. LNBODSIZE is the natural log transformation of the total number of directors. INSTOWN is the percentage of top 5 institutional shareholders. MANOWN is direct managerial shareholdings. NUMEST is the number of analysts following a firm. LNNUMEST is the natural log transformation of NUMEST. HORIZON is the number of days between the forecast date and actual announcement of earnings while LNHORIZON is natural log transformation of HORIZON. MKTCAP is total market capitalisation and MKTCAP* is natural log transformation of MKTCAP. BIGN takes the value of 1 if the auditor is Big 4 auditor. XLIST takes the value 1 if the firm is cross listed overseas. STROA is the standard deviation of returns on assets. NUMEST is the number of analysts following a firm. LNNUMEST is the natural log transformation of NUMEST. LNHORIZON is natural log transformation of HORIZON. MKTCAP* is natural log transformation of MKTCAP. BIGN takes the value of 1 if the auditor is Big 4 auditor. XLIST takes the value 1 if the firm is cross listed overseas. STROA is the standard deviation of returns on assets.
Sources:
